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I. INTRODUCTION
A woman arrives at her obstetrician's office for her annual check-up and
to share the good news that she and her husband are trying to have their
second child. To her dismay, her physician tells her that he will not be able to
be her physician for her pregnancy or for the delivery of her child because he
is no longer practicing obstetrics. After being a patient for ten years, and
going through the birth of her first child with this physician, Mrs. Smith will
have to find a new physician. After years of establishing a rapport and
confidence in her physician, Mrs. Smith finds herself in a position of starting
over. One may assume that the common reaction is that it is not a big deal
and Mrs. Smith will just find another physician. However, it is an issue, and
the availability of locating a new obstetrician may not be as easy as one
might imagine, especially in a rural area.
This Note addresses the critical state of obstetrics and gynecology
(OB/GYN) practices in the United States, the risks it is creating in women's
health, and how arbitration could be a key factor in solving this problem. The
Note begins by looking at the rising cost of insurance premiums and their
effect on the specific practice of OB/GYN and addresses the crisis in the
United States that has reached critical levels in nearly half of the states. The
current crisis is that OB/GYNs all over the country are dropping obstetric
care from their practices due to the dramatic increase in insurance premiums.
Part 111 provides a background of the arbitration process and discusses the
feasibility of utilizing contractual binding arbitration clauses between OB
physicians and their patients. Part IV proposes a new way to utilize
arbitration as an incentive to reduce premiums for OB/GYNs and provide
patients a more accessible forum to resolve disputes and receive
compensation. This Note concludes by recommending the establishment and
practice of arbitration agreements in the specific field of OB/GYN as a way
to reduce premiums.
* J.D. Candidate, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, 2006; B.A.
summa cum laude, Ohio University, 1998. I would like to thank my husband, Doug, for
his love, support, and patience. Also, I would like to thank my sister, Dr. Mollie Ezzie,
for inspiring me through her dedication and joy in practicing obstetrics and gynecology.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Medical Insurance for OB/GYN Physicians
When a physician practices medicine, there is a possibility that an injury
to the patient may occur. The basis of such injury may not always be the
physician's fault, but the process that is used to determine that outcome is
often expensive and lengthy. As a result, most physicians will take out
medical malpractice insurance1 to assist with potential costs and to protect
their livelihood.2 Insurance coverage is purchased from physician-owned or
operated insurance companies, 3 commercial insurance companies, or self-
insured physicians.4
There are two basic types of malpractice insurance: "claims-made" and
"occurrence-made." Claims-made insurance "provides coverage for claims
that arise from incidents that occur and are reported during the time the
insurance policy is in force."5 This protects the physician from a malpractice
claim only if the company that insured the physician, at the time of the
1 The most common policies carried by physicians are $1 million of coverage per
incident and $3 million in coverage per year. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO-03-702, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: MULTIPLE FACTORS HAVE
CONTRIBUTED TO INCREASED PREMIUM RATES 6 (2003) [hereinafter GAO-03-702]; see
also Elizabeth Swire Falker, The Medical Malpractice Crisis in Obstetrics: A Gestalt
Approach to Reform, 4 CARDOzO WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 12 (1997) (articulating that physicians
typically only carry $2-3 million in liability coverage).
2 Medical malpractice insurance is similar to other types of insurance, in which
physicians buy insurance to cover expenses related to medical malpractice claims. See
generally GAO-03-702, supra note 1 (stating that expenses of medical malpractice cases
include payments to claimants, either in judgment or settlement, and legal expenses, such
as contingent fees for attorneys). The process operates much like other insurance policies.
The physicians are the policyholders that pay a premium to the insurers in exchange for
the insurers' agreement to defend and pay future claims that fall within the policy. Id. at
7.
3 Physician Insurers Association of America (PIAA) insures approximately 60% of
all physicians in private practice in America. Id. at 6. The article does not identify
common areas of practice. The PIAA is a trade organization of more than fifty
professional liability insurance companies owned by physicians. Physician Insurers
Association of America, http://www.piaa.us/about-piaa/what jispiaa.htm (last visited
Jan. 4, 2005). Its mission as an organization is to advocate on behalf of physicians,
dentists, and other healthcare providers in areas of education, research, risk management
and legislation. Id.
4 GAO-03-702, supra note 1, at 6. Self-insured physicians take on the responsibility
of claims themselves. Id.
5 Id. at 55.
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alleged injury, is the same company at the time the claim is filed with the
court.6 If the same company is not insuring the physician, the physician is not
covered unless the physician purchased "tail" insurance.7
The second type of insurance is occurrence-made insurance. This type of
coverage provides seamless coverage for the physician even if the physician
experiences a job or location change. 8 An occurrence-made insurance policy
provides the physician with coverage as long as the physician was insured by
that carrier at the time of the alleged occurrence.9 The physician's insurance
provider does not have to be the same insurance carrier when the claim is
filed with the court. 1
B. An Increase in Insurance Premiums in the OB/GYN Specialty
Over the past few years, there has been a continual trend in the medical
specialty of obstetrics-increased insurance premiums."I In the specialty of
OB/GYN, there have been reported increases in malpractice insurance
premiums ranging from 19.6 percent to 56.2 percent. 12 States without
6 Patrick C. Alguire, Malpractice Insurance, AM. C. PHYSICIANS,
http://www.acponline.org/counseling/malpractice-insurance.htm (last visited Feb. 28,
2006).
7 Tail insurance is defined as "an option available from a former carrier to continue
coverage for those dates that the claims-made coverage was in effect." GAO-03-702,
supra note 1, at 55. The cost of tail insurance is typically a one time assessment that can
be 1.5 to 2 times a standard annual malpractice insurance premium. See Alguire, supra
note 6.
8 Alguire, supra note 6.
9 1d.
10 Physicians should also be aware of the type of losses that are covered. "Pure loss"
is coverage only for the amount awarded to the plaintiff, and "ultimate net loss" is
coverage for the attorney's fees and costs as well. See Alguire, supra note 6. "Claims that
arise from incidents occurring during the policy period that are reported after the policy's
cancellation date are still covered in the future." See GAO-03-702, supra note 1, at 55.
11 See Sarah Domin, Comment, Where Have All the Baby-Doctors Gone? Women's
Access to Healthcare in Jeopardy: Obstetrics and the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 53
CATH. U. L. REv. 499, 541 (2004) (concluding that the trend of increasing medical
malpractice claims and high jury awards hit obstetrics the hardest); Robert Ward Shaw,
Comment, Punitive Damages in Medical Malpractice: An Economic Evaluation, 81 N.C.
L. REV. 2371, 2378 (2003) (discussing the trend of increasing healthcare costs, including
medical malpractice insurance costs, to which obstetrics and gynecology are particular
vulnerable).
12 William P. Gunnar, Is There an Acceptable Answer to Rising Medical
Malpractice Premiums, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 465, 471 (2004). In Utah, medical
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legislated tort reform13 have experienced dramatic increases in insurance
premiums when compared to states that have implemented tort reform
legislation. 14 For example, in the context of medical malpractice, California
is well-known for its tort reform and is often used as a model by other
states. 15 In a comparison between states that have not implemented
legislative reform and California, the picture of the OB/GYN crisis starts to
become clear. From 1998 to 2002, the largest rate increases in medical
malpractice insurance premiums for OB/GYNs have been in Ohio, Oregon,
and Pennsylvania, rising 148.5 percent, 126 percent, and 125.3 percent,
malpractice premiums for OB/GYNs have increased even more dramatically with rates
rising by 94% in the last four years. See Impact of Medical Liability Issues on Patient
Care, Cong. Testimony by Federal Document Clearing House, 108th Cong. (2004)
[hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Charles W. Sorenson, Jr., MD).
13 One example of tort reform includes legislation for non-economic damage caps.
Recently, Ohio legislated a non-economic cap that limits a non-economic award up to a
maximum of $350,000 for each plaintiff or $500,000 if multiple plaintiffs are involved.
See Bryan A. Liang & LiLan Ren, Medical Liability Insurance and Damage Caps:
Getting Beyond Band Aids to Substantive Systems Treatment to Improve Quality and
Safety in Healthcare, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 501, 510 n.71 (2004) (illustrating Ohio as one
of the states in a crisis mode trying to legislate tort reform, specifically non-economic
caps); see, e.g., Kevin J. Gfell, The Constitutional and Economic Implications of a
National Cap on Non-Economic Damages in Medical Malpractice Actions, 37 IND. L.
REv. 773, 801-02 (2004).
14 States experiencing greater than 50% increases in insurance premiums in 2002 are
as follows: Arkansas, 112%; Florida, 75%; Mississippi, 99%; Nevada, 50%; New
Hampshire, 50%; Ohio, 60%; Oregon, 80%; Tennessee, 65%; Virginia, 113%. U.S. Dept.
of Health & Human Services, Special Update on Medical Liability Crisis (September 25,
2002), http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/mlupdl.htm [hereinafter Special Update].
15 California is one of the pioneers in malpractice tort reforms. Its passage of the
Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) in 1975 is viewed as some of the
most effective legislation in reducing malpractice insurance premiums. See Liang & Ren,
supra note 13, at 505 (discussing the implementation of California's successful
legislation and its intended result of providing affordable health care by limiting punitive
damages); Lauren Elizabeth Rallo, Comment, The Medical Malpractice Crisis-Who
Will Deliver the Babies of Today, the Leaders of Tomorrow?, 20 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L.
& POL'Y 509, 512 (2004) (commenting that California's tort reform is viewed as one of
the most successful models of reform). Furthermore, the federal government's attempt for
tort reform is modeled after California's MICRA. Id. at 536; Andrea D. Stailey,
Comment, The Health Act's Same Old Story, Different Congress Dilemma: Overhauling
the Health Act and Unifying Congress as a Remedy for Tort Reform, 40 TULSA L. REv.
187, 198-200 (2004) (stating that the federal act is modeled after California's MICRA
and expands on the California legislation to aid in stabilizing liability costs).
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respectively. 16 Whereas, the average insurance premium rates in states with
monetary limits on non-economic damages are lower than the national
average as a whole. 17
C. Availability of OB/GYN Physicians
The importance of insurance premiums goes beyond the mere "expense"
to the physician. There is a direct correlation between insurance premiums
and physician availability. 18 Availability is not limited to geographic
accessibility for patients, but also includes availability of physicians in the
specialty.
1. Geographical Availability
According to the American Medical Association (AMA) 23 states are
experiencing a full-blown medical liability crisis. 19 In these crisis states,
16 See Special Update, supra note 14 (referencing the Medical Liability Monitor
2002 Report, Sept. 24, 2002 (preliminary data)).
17 The total average insurance premium for the United States as a whole is $49,530
for OB/GYNs. Special Update, supra note 14, at tbl.8. Insurance premiums for
OB/GYNs in states with non-economic limits on damages are as follows: Indiana,
$19,486; South Dakota, $18,633; North Dakota, $24,971; Hawaii, $42,928; Montana,
$40,693; Utah, $45,588; New Mexico, $35,915; California, $48,704. Id. The one
exception listed is Michigan, which had an average insurance premium of $88,945 for
OB/GYNs. Id.
18 A 2002 survey by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
(ACOG) found that 73% of OB/GYN specialists have been forced to retire, relocate, or
modify their practice. Alex Adrianson, Why Doctors Are Quitting Medical Practice,
CONSUMER'S REs. MAG., June 2003, at 10 (discussing OB/GYNs altering or leaving their
practice in states such as Missouri, Nevada, Kentucky, Washington, West Virginia,
Pennsylvania, and New York because of malpractice premiums). A correlation is drawn
when these states are cross-referenced with the ACOG's Red Alert states. See The
American College of Obstetrician and Gynecologists, ACOG's Red Alert on Ob-Gyn
Care Reaches 23 States (Aug. 26, 2004),
http://www.acog.org/fror home/publications/press-releases/nrO8-26-04.cfm [hereinafter
Red Alert on Ob-Gyn Care]; see, e.g., Betsy Bates, Liability Crisis Drives Away OBs;
ACOG Issues Red Alert, OB GYN NEWS, June 15, 2002.
19 Red Alert on Ob-Gyn Care, supra note 18. For example, in Massachusetts, a
confluence of factors led the AMA to add Massachusetts to the list. Among them: 50% of
neurosurgeons, 41% of orthopedic surgeons, 36% of obstetricians, and 29% of general
surgeons have reduced their scope of practice. The number of jury awards of more than
$2 million quadrupled over five years. Median settlements in medical negligence cases
increased to $925,000 in 2002, up from $600,000 in 2000. Amednews.com,
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physicians are "retiring early, discontinuing high-risk services[,] or leaving
the state altogether because of high medical liability insurance rates."20 The
rising insurance premiums result in states experiencing critical physician
shortage,21 particularly in obstetrical care.22 For example, in a Mississippi
town, where the population is less than 20,000, women no longer have
obstetric care.23 In Utah, women have fewer and fewer options regarding
obstetric care, making the specialty of obstetrics a critical area of concern.24
As of October 2002 in Clark County, Nevada, there were only 106
physicians performing deliveries for an estimated 23,000 expected
deliveries. 25
The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists26 (ACOG)
continues to identify states that are in a crisis mode for women's health. In
2002, ACOG identified 16 states that were categorized at "Red Alert"
status. 27 By 2004, the ACOG identified seven more, bringing the total to 23
Massachusetts Earns Dubious Distinction, (July 5, 2004), http://www.ama-
assn.org/amednews/2004/07/05/prl 10705.htm.
20 Amednews.com, supra note 19.
21 According to the AMA, the states experiencing a full-blown medical liability
crisis include Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, West Virginia and Wyoming. Id.
22 Gunnar, supra note 12, at 471 (stating there is also a reported shortage in
neurosurgical care).
23 Id. at 473.
24 Hearings, supra note 12 (referring to a statement made by Charles W. Sorenson,
Jr.).
25 The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, The Facts of theLiability
Crisis, http://www.acog.org/departments/dept-notice.cfm?recno=l l&bulletin=2688 (last
visited Feb. 28, 2006) [hereinafter The Facts of the Liability Crisis].
26 The ACOG is a national medical organization representing over 46,000 members
who provide health care for women. See The American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists Celebrating 50
Years of Improving Women's Health, http://www.acog.org/from-home/acoginfo.cfm (last
visited Feb. 28, 2006).
27 Red Alert status is determined by a number of factors established by the ACOG.
In addition to the state's tort reform history, such factors include:
the lack of available professional liability coverage for ob-gyns in the state; the
number of carriers currently writing policies in the state, as well as the number
leaving the medical liability insurance market; the cost, and rate of increase, of
annual premiums based on reports from industry monitors; a combination of
geographical, economic, and other conditions exacerbating an already existing
shortage of ob-gyns and other physicians ....
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states. Nearly half of the nation's states are faced with disruptions to
obstetrical care.28 As a result of rising premiums, OB/GYNs are faced with
decisions such as dropping obstetrics from their practice, retiring, relocating,
decreasing gynecological surgical procedures, decreasing the number of
deliveries, and decreasing the amount of high risk obstetric care.29
2. Physicians Elect Not to Specialize in OB/GYN
The availability of OB/GYN physicians is also affected by medical
students' specialty election. In 2004, the number of U.S. medical students
entering the specialty of OB/GYN declined for the third consecutive year;
only 65% of the residency openings for OB/GYN were filled by U.S.
medical students. 30 Also, the sweeping trend of women patients selecting
female physicians has severely affected the number of male students electing
OB/GYN as a specialty. 31 The continuation of these trends will result in
women's inability to receive accessible care because new doctors are turning
away from the specialty. 32
The availability of OB/GYN physicians is not only a future concern. It is
a current issue. One out of seven OB/GYN physicians has left the practice of
medicine. 33 The driving force behind this movement is the fear of being sued
The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Red Alert: The Hot States
(May 6, 2002), http://www.acog.org/fromhome/publications/pressreleases/nrO5-06-02-
2.cfm.
28 Red Alert on Ob-Gyn Care, supra note 18; see also The Facts of the Liability
Crisis, supra note 25.
29 Mary Ellen Schneider, Maryland: A State in 'Crisis' for Ob.gyns, OB GYN
NEws, Oct. 15, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 12140522 (discussing each of the listed
actions taken by OB/GYNS); see also GOP Fast Facts, Medical Liability,
http://www.rpof.org/fastfacts/medical/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2006).
30 Schneider, supra note 29.
31 John T. Queenan, MD, The Future of Obstetrics and Gynecology, 102
OBsTETRIcs & GYNECOLOGY 441, 441-42 (2003) (stating that as men shy away from
obstetrics due to less market demand for male OB/GYN physicians the pool of applicants
for OB/GYN residency programs has been nearly cut in half.
32 The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Medical Liability
Survey Reaffirms More Ob-Gyns Are Quitting Obstetrics (July 16, 2004),
http://www.acog.org/from home/publications/press-releases/nr07-16-04.cfm [hereinafter
Medical Liability Survey].
33 The percentage presented is representative of the OB/GYN physicians through a
survey of ACOG's fellows. "[O]ne in seven ACOG Fellows report[s] that they had
stopped practicing obstetrics because of the high risk of liability claims." Id.
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and the high risk of liability claims. 34 OB/GYNs have an average of 2.6
claims filed against them during the life of their careers.35 The existence of
claims, however, does not equate to negligence by the physician.
36
34 Id.
In a recent ACOG survey, 76.3% of the Florida ob-gyns who responded indicated
that they have changed their practices as a result of this crisis. These changes
included retiring, relocating, decreasing gynecologic surgical procedures, no longer
performing major gynecologic surgery, and decreasing the number of deliveries and
amount of high-risk obstetric care. 21.69% of Florida respondents indicated that
they stopped practicing obstetrics due to the unavailability and unaffordability of
liability insurance ..... According to the Delta Democrat Times, 324 Mississippi
physicians stopped delivering babies in the last decade. Only 10% of family
physicians deliver babies. In the ACOG practice change survey, 86.2% of
responding Nevada ob-gyns indicated that they have changed their practices, with
27.59% dropping obstetrics.
The Facts of the Liability Crisis, supra note 25. Additional changes, due to liability costs
and availability, within the OB/GYN practice include: a decrease in the amount of high-
risk obstetric care, 25.2%; a decrease in the number of deliveries, 12.2%; physicians no
longer practicing obstetrics, 9.2%; a decrease in gynecologic surgical procedures
performed, 14.8%; physicians no longer doing major gynecologic surgery, 5.4%. Medical
Liability Survey, supra note 32; see also Interview by CNBC Kudlow & Cramer with
Bill Brock (Sept. 15, 2004). The statistics listed above are extremely similar to the
changes reported by the ACOG, after surveying their fellows, in response to the risk of
liability claims or being sued. The ACOG reported: a decrease in the amount of high-risk
obstetric care, 22%; obstetricians that stopped offering/performing VBACs, 14.8%; a
decrease in the number of deliveries, 9.2%; physicians no longer practicing obstetrics,
14%; a decrease in gynecologic surgical procedures performed, 12.3%; and physicians no
longer doing major gynecologic surgery, 5.6%. Medical Liability Survey, supra note 32.
35 Red Alert on Ob-Gyn Care, supra note 18. A detailed breakdown of the various
claims sought against OB/GYNs are as follows:
Obstetric claims accounted for 61% of claims against ob-gyns; 38% were
gynecologic claims. From 1999-2002, the top four primary obstetric allegations
were: neurologically impaired infant (34%); stillbirth/neonatal death (15%); other
infant injury-major (7%); and delay in or failure to diagnose (7%). From 1999-
2002, the top four primary gynecologic allegations were: delay in or failure to
diagnose (29%); patient injury-major (25%); patient injury-minor (15%); and
otherlnon-specified (12%).
Medical Liability Survey, supra note 32.
36 A physician may have a claim brought against them but slightly less
than half of the time the claim is dropped.
Almost half (49.5%) of claims against ob-gyns are dropped by plaintiffs' attorneys,
dismissed or settled without payment. Of cases that do proceed to court, ob-gyns
win eight out of ten times (81.3%) .... Closed claim resolution experience: No
payout-49.5%; Dropped by plaintiff-33.6%; Dismissed by court-13%; Settled
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OB/GYNs rank number one among 28 specialty groups in the number of
claims filed against them.37 Additionally, the average cost of defending a
medical malpractice suit for an OB/GYN is the highest among all
specialties. 38 In the 1990s, OB/GYNs were second to neurologists in the
average claim payout, but moved into first place by 2000 with the average
claim payment being just under $400,000.39 Based on these facts, one might
conclude that there is a direct correlation between increased claims and
negligence; however, that is not true. Over half of the claims brought against
OB/GYNs are dropped by plaintiff attorneys, dismissed, or settled without
payment.40 In cases that proceed to trial, OB/GYNs were awarded favorable
decisions in more than 65% percent of the resolved cases.4 1 From an
alternative perspective, a plaintiff received a favorable decision only nine
percent of the time when the case reached a jury or court verdict.42
Accordingly, to attain a resolution of a claim through the judicial process
requires vast sums of time and money, and takes an emotional toll on the
physician. 43
In cases that reach a jury verdict, the awarded payouts can be
staggering." In obstetrics, a physician is caring for the health of both the
without payment-2.9%; Settled with payment-36.0%; Arbitration or other
alternative dispute resolution mechanism--2.7%; Jury/court verdict-8.6%.
Medical Liability Survey, supra note 32.
37 Medical Liability Insurance-American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologist: Before the House Government Reform Committee Subcommittee on
Human Rights and Wellness, 108th Cong. (2003) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of
ACOG).
38 The average cost listed in 2000 was $34,308. Id.
39 Id.
40 The reported figure of dismissed claims without settlement is 53.9%. Id.
41 Id.
42 Medical Liability Survey, supra note 32.
43 In 2000, the average cost of litigation for a claim was $34,308. See supra note 38
and accompanying text. Emotionally, a physician can feel angry and confused. Many
times the emotions experienced by the physician are not able to be put into words
because a physician does not need to be found liable of malpractice to suffer the affects
of a lawsuit. See John Gibeaut, The Med-Mal Divide, A.B.A. J., Mar. 2005, at 44.
44 "The average jury award in cases of "neurologically impaired infants," which
account for 30% of the types of claims against obstetricians, is nearly $1 million, but the
figure can soar much higher. One recent award in a Philadelphia case reached $100
million." The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Nation's Obstetrical
Care Endangered by Growing Liability Insurance Crisis (May 6, 2002),
http://www.acog.org/fromhome/publications/pressreleases/nrO5-06-02-1.cfm.
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mother and unborn child.45 In that regard, OB/GYNs are particularly
vulnerable to increased medical liability awards because every time a
newborn child is not "perfect," there is a chance of a lawsuit.46 The amount
of medical liability awards has increased dramatically over the past few
years, rising to median levels of over $2,000,000.4 7 For example, the median
medical liability award jumped from $700,000 in 1999 to $1,000,000 in
2000.48 In October 2003, the median award for childbirth cases was
$2,050,000-it is the highest of all medical liability cases.49
In addition to large monetary awards, the average length of time from
filing a complaint to the closing of an OB/GYN medical malpractice claim is
four to seven years. 50 Based on these factors, it is necessary to find or create
a more efficient, streamlined process to quickly weed out non-meritorious
claims and provide compensation for those who have truly been injured. As
this Note proposes, the implementation of an arbitration model could be the
necessary catalyst to aid in reshaping the approach of medical malpractice
insurance premiums for OB/GYNs.
III. MAKING THE MOVE TO ARBITRATION
The perception of OB/GYN physicians is that they are constantly
targeted for lawsuits anytime a baby is not perfect.51 It is this fear that is a
45 Obstetrics is defined as "[t]he specialty of medicine concerned with the care of
women during pregnancy, parturition, and the puerperium." STEDMAN'S CONCISE
MEDICAL DICTIONARY FOR THE HEALTH PROFESSIONS 616 (3d ed. 1997).
46 See Nancy Pariser, Letter to the Editor, Springtime for Obstetrics and
Gynecology: Will the Specialty Continue to Blossom?, 103 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY
197 (2004), available at http://www.greenjoumal.org/cgi/content/full/103/l/197
(providing her opinion as a physician that "[physicians] are held to the impossible
standard of delivering the perfect baby. Anything short of the perfect baby with our
current system is guaranteed malpractice litigation").
47 Hearing, supra note 37, at I, 6 (statement of ACOG).
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Thirteen percent of OB/GYN cases take more than seven years. Medical Liability
Survey, supra note 32; see also U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuM. SERvs., NATIONAL
PRACTITIONER DATA BANK: 2003 ANN. REP. 4 (2003) available at http://www.npdb-
hipdb.com/pubs/stats/2003_NPDBAnnual-Report.pdf (reporting that for physician
medical malpractice payments the mean time period between an incident that lead to a
payment and the payment itself was 4.59 years).
51 James Pinkerton, Liability War Zones; Doctors Assail Lawsuit Abuses, Insurance
Costs, Hous. CHRON. RIO GRANDE VALLEY BUREAU, June 19, 1994; see also Pariser,
supra note 46.
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driving force behind their decisions to stop practicing obstetrics and
delivering babies. 52 The use of arbitration53 may aid in subduing these fears
because it can provide a contractually binding agreement to settle disputes
between the parties while eliminating the potential, lengthy process of the
judicial system.54 Without a new approach, the risk of physicians dropping
obstetrics from their practice will not only continue but increase.
A. Creating a Standard Practice of Arbitration for OB/GYNs
The purpose of arbitration is to provide an out-of-court method that
parties can utilize to reduce the cost of litigation by agreeing to resolve their
dispute using a mutually agreed upon arbitrator.55 The Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA) passed in 1925 enabled the courts to uphold arbitration clauses
and put such clauses on equal footing with other contractual agreements. 56
52 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
53 This Note will focus on the use of arbitration and not mediation. The use of
mediation does not provide a binding decision upon which insurance companies can use
in actuary models.
Mediation has been defined by the American Arbitration Association as
"intervention by an impartial third person with the purpose of helping the parties
reach their own solution." Thus, mediation differs from arbitration in that the latter
usually involves a final and binding decision by [a] neutral third party, whereas a
mediation process usually requires the third party to act only as a facilitator, and to
allow the parties themselves to reach an agreement. A mediation agreement is
enforceable under state contract law, whereas an arbitration award can be enforced
either under federal labor laws... or under state or federal arbitration acts which
provide for labor and commercial arbitration enforcement.
Jan William Sturner, Arbitration, Labor Contracts, and the ADA: The Benefits of Pre-
Dispute Arbitration Agreements and an Update on the Conflict Between the Duty to
Accommodate Seniority Rights, 21 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK L. REV. 455, 471 n.71 (1999)
(citations omitted).
54 See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice: The Demise of Due Process in
American Law, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1945, 1945 (1996) (defining arbitration as a process that
parties can use to resolve disputes in a final and binding manner outside the tradition
court system).
55 Shelly Smith, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts: Consumer
Protection and the Circumvention of the Judicial System, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191, 1192
(2001). "[Alrbitration is a process whereby parties voluntarily submit their disputes for
resolution by one or more impartial third persons, instead of by a judicial tribunal
provided by law." Id. at 1192 n.7 (citing Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American
Arbitration, 63 IND. L. J. 425,425 n.1 (1988)).
5 6 Id. at 1197.
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The rationale of the FAA was to create a process that aided in reducing the
cost of dispute resolution and encouraged adverse parties to salvage their
relationship.57 This rationale is identical to the underlying requirements for
establishing a dispute resolution practice standard in OB/GYN medical
malpractice claims. 58
An additional requirement for a successful arbitration model in the
OB/GYN specialty is confidentiality.59 As discussed, OB/GYNs have the
highest rates of claims, not as a result of proven negligence, but as a result of
circumstance.60 The filing of one claim can have the effect of branding a
physician as "negligent," thus impairing the physician's ability to attract new
patients.61 Oftentimes, a claim against the physician is publicized, but the
dismissal is not.62
The requirement of confidentiality is not inherent in arbitration
agreements, nor is the requirement of a written opinion.63 When a dispute is
arbitrated privately, the decision does not act as precedent for future
decisions.64 This can be attractive for physicians because previous claims or
57 Id. at 1220 ("promot[ing] extra-judicial resolution of disputes for various public
policy reasons, including the reduction in the cost of dispute resolution and the
encouragement of adverse parties to salvage their relationships").
58 Id.
59 The insurance of confidentiality is important to physicians. See Elizabeth Rolph et
al., Arbitration Agreements in Health Care: Myths and Reality, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter & Spring 1997, at 153, 155 ("Providers, particularly physicians, welcome
the confidentiality of the private arbitration forum. Allegations of negligence are often
highly personalized attacks, which many providers prefer to keep from public view.").
60 OB/GYNs have the highest number of claims bought against them, yet over 50%
are dismissed or settled without payment. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
61 Many times physicians learn of lawsuits through newspaper articles and word of
mouth. For example, Dr. Kopen had removed a patient's gallbladder and four years later
was sued by the patient for failure to discover the patient's colon cancer. The suit was
dropped but Dr. Kopen stated that the publicity caused referrals to "nosedive" for his
intestinal and colonic procedures. Dr. Kopen stated that his practice has never fully
recovered. See Gibeaut, supra note 43, at 39.
62 Id.
63 Smith, supra note 55, at 1222 ("[M]any arbitration forums and contracts do not
require written opinions and even go as far as requiring confidentiality of the arbitration
altogether.").
64 Unless disputants require otherwise, arbitrators need not provide a written
statement of their reasoning. Even if such a statement is required, it has no
precedential value. Thus, disputes proceeding to resolution in arbitration are not
integrated into the dynamic process of creating case law. Precisely because health
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settlements will not establish precedent.65 This is important because the
circumstances of each patient's care are unique and claims are subject to
distinct fact patterns. Each case must be evaluated on its own merits and the
settlement from a previous case cannot act as a pre-determinate for a
subsequent case.66 To that end, arbitration can provide a forum to discuss the
particular merits of the present dispute (between the patient and the
physician) without the risk of casting a negative persona of the physician
before causation is determined.
It is important to note, however, that an arbitration clause in a contractual
agreement is not an absolute determinate that parties can only resolve their
dispute through arbitration. Although the United States Supreme Court has a
history of enforcing arbitration agreements under the FAA,67 a window still
exists for litigation, even when an arbitration clause is present in the
contract.68 Therefore, a patient is not completely foreclosed from litigation
by agreeing to arbitration. 69
care delivery is undergoing such profound and rapid change, large numbers of health
care disputes should not be removed from the courts.
Rolph, supra note 59, at 156. See also Smith, supra note 55, at 1222-23.
65 Smith, supra note 55, at 1223, (discussing the relationship between arbitration and
precedent). Concurrently, the patient may not view this as "advantageous" to their
position because they may not have knowledge of previous cases. Cf. Id. at 1244
(comparing a consumer to a patient).
66 Rolph et al., supra note 59, at 156; see also Smith, supra note 55, at 1231 n.295
("Advocates for arbitration view the lack of a written opinion as a benefit that makes
arbitration a more efficient process than litigation .... They serve to put an effective end
to dispute resolution, preventing a case from dragging on for months or years in the
appeal stage.") (citations omitted).
67 See generally Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (holding
that the risk of being saddled with prohibitive costs was too speculative to justify
invalidating the arbitration agreement); Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S.
681 (1996) (holding that the Montana state statute is preempted by the Federal
Arbitration Act); Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477
(1989) (holding that the arbitration clause was valid because it was a procedural remedy
and did not affect the substantive provision of the Securities Act of 1993); Perry v.
Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted a
California statute authorizing appellee to maintain an action despite the existence of an
arbitration agreement); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614 (1985) (holding that the arbitration agreement or the forum selection was not
invalidated based on the antitrust claim alone).
68 Smith, supra note 55, at 1241.
69 A patient's right to seek judicial remedies through litigation may not be
foreclosed if the suit is based on a statutory violation that provides a preclusion of
judicial remedies. A statute enacted by Congress may preclude a waiver of judicial
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The use of arbitration in OB/GYN medical malpractice cases will
streamline the process and act as a better predictor for insurance companies,
which in turn could be utilized to reduce insurance premiums. 70 Furthermore,
arbitration will ease court congestion, is less expensive, and affords
expeditious disposition of disputes. 71 Litigation in OB/GYN cases, on the
other hand, exacts longer timeframes and more expenses than most other
medical specialties.72 The right to voluntarily enter into binding arbitration of
medical malpractice claims is recognized and available as long as the
contract to arbitrate is drafted in a prescribed form according to the state's
statutes.73 Physicians are seeking out alternative solutions to help combat the
high risk of liability-solutions like arbitration. States need to provide the
capabilities and support for such a solution.74
B. Finding the Right Type of Arbitration
Mandatory binding arbitration is typically found in consumer product
agreements and employment law. 75 Simply copying the models of mandatory
remedies, such as arbitration, in which it would provide an exception to compel
arbitration of statutory rights under the FAA. See Smith, supra note 55, at 1241 (citing
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991); Randolph v. Green Tree
Fin. Corp., 991 F. Supp. 1410, 1420 (M.D. Ala. 1997)).
70 See discussion infra Part [V.A.
71 Hilleary v. Garvin, 238 Cal. Rptr. 247, 249 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (citing Hawkins
v. Superior Court, 152 Cal. Rptr. 491, 493 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979)) (finding that the parties
have the right to voluntary arbitration of medical malpractice claims because it is a
method that is less expensive, eases court congestion, and affords an expeditious
disposition of the matter).
72 See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
73 California's codification of the right to arbitrate medical malpractice can be found
in the Code of Civil Procedure § 1295(a) providing: "[a]ny contract for medical services
which contains a provision for arbitration of any dispute as to professional negligence of
a health care provider shall have such provision as the first article of the contract ... 
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1295(a) (West 1982).
74 Brian Rust, Physicians Seek Arbitration to Protect Them from Lawsuits, DAILY
UNIVERSE, Oct. 14, 2004; see also Jennifer Silverman, Patients Asked to Sign Contracts:
Company Offers Plans to Curb Frivolous Lawsuits, OB GYN NEWS, May 1, 2004
(stating that physicians are taking a stance against malpractice lawsuits by asking their
patients to sign an agreement, specifying that they won't sue for any frivolous reason).
75 See generally Michael R. Holden, Arbitration of State-Law Claims by Employees:
An Argument for Containing Federal Arbitration Law, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1695, 1699-
1703 (1995) (discussing the shift toward arbitration in employment law and its use as the
primary means of resolving labor disputes); Smith, supra note 55, at 1191-93 (opining
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binding arbitration from these areas of law and applying it to OB/GYN-
patient agreements would not produce the desired result.76 The underlying
dynamics of mandatory binding arbitration, however, can be utilized to help
construct a standardized practice of arbitration in the field of OB/GYN
medical malpractice cases. 77
A mandatory binding arbitration clause is a clause found in a contract
that stipulates both parties have agreed that if a dispute arises the parties will
arbitrate out of court, waiving their rights to the judicial system.78 In
consumer law, the standard is that a mandatory arbitration clause is on a
"take it or leave it" basis.79 Most companies require the consumer to sign the
agreement before they will do business with them.80 The arbitration clauses
in these agreements are seldom discussed with the consumer and the
consumer does not seek legal advice before entering into the agreement.
81
This approach is unacceptable in the medical malpractice context, and does
not meet the established standard for an arbitration agreement between an
OB/GYN and his or her patient. 82 However, this does not deter the use of
mandatory arbitration for medical malpractice claims.
Another contention against mandatory binding arbitration is its
constitutionality within the context of medical malpractice claims. 83 'The
that under modem consumer law, consumers are forced into arbitration and banned from
the judicial system).
76 See generally Holden, supra note 75; Smith, supra note 55.
77 The underlying mechanics referenced are the basic elements of both parties
entering into a contractual agreement, stipulating the mandatory requirement to arbitrate
and the binding affect of the resolution handed down by the arbitrator. See 9 U.S.C. § 2
(2000).
78 Smith, supra note 55, at 1194.
79 Id. at 1192.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Various state supreme courts have held that arbitration agreements are not
enforceable if they are entered into under a pressured situation or without the
understanding of the patient. See Broemmer v. Abortion Services of Phoenix, Ltd., 840
P.2d 1013, 1017-1018 (Ariz. 1992) (holding that the agreement to arbitrate was an
adhesion contract because it was beyond reasonable expectations); Wixted v. Pepper, 693
P.2d 1259, 1260-61 (Nev. 1985) (holding that a mandatory arbitration agreement was
unenforceable when it was included in a form given to a patient at a clinic to sign before
receiving treatment); Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 363--64 (Utah 1996) (holding the
mandatory arbitration clause was procedurally unconscionable where a patient was given
the agreement to arbitrate all medical malpractice claims "minutes away" from surgery).
83 It has been argued that mandatory binding arbitration clauses are unconstitutional
on the basis that they violates the 7th Amendment, an individual's right to a jury trial.
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Supreme Court has interpreted the purpose of the FAA as not to compel
arbitration in every circumstance, but to compel arbitration in a manner
provided for by contract when the parties mutually agree to arbitrate. '84 The
Supreme Court has held that "[a]rbitration is simply a matter of contract
between parties; it is a way to resolve those disputes-but only those
disputes-that the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration. ' 85 This
interpretation of the FAA requires that the parties intend to enter into an
arbitration agreement, not just sign an agreement. The parties' intention is
determined by the court before a mandatory arbitration clause can be
enforced. 86
1. Consumer Law: Taking the Good, Leaving the Bad
The use of arbitration in consumer contracts has been successful; thus, it
is prudent to try and utilize its strengths in the implementation and
enforcement of arbitration in OB/GYN medical malpractice claims. There
are, however, strong differences between the two markets that prohibit
utilizing an identical pattern. For example, in consumer law transactions,
such as credit card contracts, consumers receive agreements in the mail
which do not adequately explain the terms of the agreement in a way that a
lay person would understand.87 Additionally, consumers do not even
Marissa Dawn Lawson, Judicial Economy at What Cost? An Argument for Finding
Binding Arbitration Clauses Prima Facie Unconscionable, 23 REv. LrITG. 463, 469-70
(2004) (discussing the Supreme Court's analysis of procedural rights versus substantive
rights and the ability to waive the right to a jury trial by an arbitration agreement if it is a
procedural right). However, the United States Supreme Court has held that, in certain
circumstances, mandatory binding arbitration is not a violation of an individual's
constitutional right to trial by jury. Id; see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
84 Smith, supra note 55, at 1236 (discussing the possibility that mandatory
arbitration clauses may violate contract law and the importance of knowing the parties'
intentions).
85 Id.
86 Id. at 1236-37. Problems may arise when parties do not have equal bargaining
powers or unknowingly consent to waive their right to access the judicial system under
the 7th and 14th Amendments. Id. at 1220.
87 Credit card contracts are typically difficult to understand. See Libby Wells,
Understanding Credit Card Contracts
http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/cc/19991101a.asp (last visited Feb. 28, 2006) ("It's a
guarantee [a consumer] will have difficulty interpreting the fine print. As [one] read[s]
the contract, underline parts that are incomprehensible, take notes and then ask the card
company for clarification.").
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typically read the terms of the agreement. 88 This differs dramatically from
the physician-patient relationship and the coinciding arbitration agreements.
In cases when there was not a reasonable expectation for the patient to
understand the clause, or the timing was inappropriate, courts have refused to
uphold contractual agreements containing arbitration clauses between
patients and physicians. 89 The result of these cases reinforces the concept
that as part of a standardized arbitration model, the physician must discuss
the arbitration agreement with the patient and the patient must enter it
voluntarily.
i. Party Differences: Consumer v. Patient and Corporate v.
Physician
The analogous relationship between both sets of parties demonstrates the
difference between consumers and patients. In consumer law, many
consumers are denied the use of the judicial system because they
unknowingly agreed to some alternative dispute resolution method found in
the agreement. 90 In OB/GYN cases, however, tolerance for such practices
would not exist. This is because of the unique nature and factors of OB/GYN
practice. 91
The patient-physician relationship is a continual relationship that is built
on trust and performance; the relationship between a woman and her
OB/GYN is unique.92 A woman will usually select a physician with whom
88 See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHi. L. REv. 1203, 1217 (2003) (elucidating that commentators
have routinely observed that consumers often fail to read the standard terms in contracts);
see also R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother's Keeper: The Inability of an
Informed Minority to Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 635, 635-36
(1996) (stating that the "typically fine-print terms are frequently not read by those that
sign the contracts").
89 See cases cited supra note 82.
90 Smith, supra note 55, at 1192.
91 The care an OB/GYN provides to her patients is an ongoing service that cannot be
viewed as a single transaction. For a woman, her OB/GYN is essentially her primary care
physician because she establishes a rapport with the physician, who will typically
examine the woman once a year, regardless of illness. Furthermore, she is entrusting the
care of her health and potentially the health of an unborn child to the physician.
9 2 Palo Alto Med. Found., 1997 Annual Report: Mary Ann Sarda-Marudo, MD,
http://www.pamf.org/about/annual/profiles/ar97_sardamaduro.html (last visited Feb. 28,
2006) ("[T]he relationship between a mother and her obstetrician is unlike any other
doctor-patient relationship-and that uniqueness becomes clear whenever she meets one
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she feels comfortable and can build a long-term relationship. Additionally,
the OB/GYN has the responsibility of not only understanding the woman's
health issues, but also all of her fertility and prenatal issues-the mother and
unborn child are two patients in one.
The differences between the physician and the "corporate entity" may
not seem as apparent as the consumer versus the patient but they are just as
distinguishable. In the consumer environment, there is usually a party which
is financially powerful. 93 The other party is typically an individual who does
not have financial or legal resources, is inexperienced, and is possibly
uneducated. 94 In medical malpractice cases, the physician is often viewed as
a financial "deep pocket," which is not always true.95 Physicians are not
typically independently wealthy or have endless amounts of money. 96
Annual insurance premiums can be as much as 30 percent of an OB/GYN's
expected income.97 This expense is paid by the physician each year and is
not refunded at the conclusion of the year if zero claims have been filed.
Moreover, in consumer law, the parties do not create relationships that
are formed on the most intimate level.98 The standard transaction in the
of her patients. There's a special bond that develops that transcends the usual doctor-
patient relationship to a much more personal level.") (internal quotations omitted).
93 The party is typically a corporation or large organization. Smith, supra note 55, at
1226.
94 Id. at 1227.
95 See The Asset Protection Law Center, The New "Deep Pockets",
http://www.rjmintz.com/new-deep-pockets.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2006) (illustrating
how a physician may be stereotyped as being a deep pocket). The belief that the
insurance provider is the deep pocket being sued is not correct because over 60% of the
cost of malpractice insurance is paid for by physicians. See Gunnar, supra note 12, at 478
(explaining the burden of the overall cost of malpractice insurance is shouldered by the
physicians).
96 See Neil Vidmar, Empirical Evidence on the Deep Pockets Hypothesis: Jury
Awards for Pain and Suffering in Medical Malpractice Cases, 43 DuKE L.J. 217, 225
(1993) (offering explanations as to why jury awards are 2.5 times higher against doctors
than individuals and 85% larger than against hospitals). One explanation presented by the
author is that "jurors may act on their beliefs that doctors and hospitals are heavily
insured or wealthy." Id.
97 For example in Ohio, OB/GYNs pay an average of 30% of their annual income to
malpractice insurance. This is 50% more than the average physician pays to medical
malpractice. Ohio Dep't of Ins., Physician Medical Malpractice Insurance Survey (Feb.
2005), http://www.ohioinsurance.gov/documents/exec-summary.pdf.
98 Consumer law is "[tihe area of law dealing with consumer transactions-that is, a
person's obtaining credit, goods, real property, or services for personal, family, or
household purposes." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 335 (8th ed. 2004).
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consumer market is an exchange of goods that is accompanied by an
agreement that sets forth governing terms in case one of the parties is not
satisfied. It is a transaction that is conducted at arms length and can hardly be
called a "relationship." For example, the credit card industry includes
arbitration agreements in adhesion contracts on a "take it or leave it" basis
because it knows that if a consumer refuses the contract, there is a large pool
of other consumers that can be targeted. Furthermore, a consumer can just
wait for the next credit card offer with better terms and conditions.
The option of simply selecting another OB/GYN physician or even
having a choice of physicians may not exist if the current trends continue for
OB/GYN services. 99 Thus, the option of simply leaving in response to a
mandatory arbitration clause1° ° will not work if another OB/GYN providing
obstetric services is not available. The validity of a mandatory arbitration
agreement is based on the arbitration agreement not being a prerequisite to
treatment.101 The "mandatory" part of arbitration can only be enforced once
the physician and the patient voluntarily form a contractual agreement.
The differences between consumer transactions and the necessities for
medical malpractice arbitration agreements in the OB/GYN context extend
beyond the contract formation stage. In the OB/GYN environment, the
relationship between the parties is more than a contractual agreement, it is a
highly personal relationship that continues year after year and can encompass
children: born, unborn, or not yet conceived.
2. Effect of Arbitration on a Minor or Child
There is an additional layer of complexity that must be raised when
discussing the use of an arbitration model in the OB/GYN specialty. In the
context of OB/GYN, the parties agreeing to arbitration may not be limited to
just the physician and patient, but may also include the "in utero fetus" or
delivered child. 10 2 This is because the mother (or parent) may have the
99 Women in some geographical areas are already faced with having one option or
none in selecting an OB/GYN. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
100 Cf. Margaret M. Harding, The Limits of the Due Process Protocols, 19 OHIO ST.
J. ON Disp. RESOL. 369, 391-92 (2004) (discussing the use of pre-dispute arbitration
clauses in employment; requiring the employee to agree on arbitration for disputes with
the employer as a condition of employment prior to knowing the exact nature of the
claim).
101 Carol A. Crocca, J.D., Annotation, Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims,
24 A.L.R. 5th 54-56 (1994).
102 An "in utero fetus" is "an unborn young... from the end of the eighth week
[after conception] to the movement of birth" that is "[w]ith-in the womb; not yet born."
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ability to bind the child to arbitration until the child's maturity at age
eighteen. 10 3 As a result, a mother can deny her child a judicial forum for
claims arising from prenatal or delivery care. 104
A parent's power to bind a child to arbitration did not always exist.
Under common law, parents had no authority to waive a claim by a child; 05
however, the common law can be abrogated by a state's statutes.106 Multiple
states have promulgated laws that allow parents to bind their children to
arbitration agreements. 10 7 In some states, a statutory revocation period must
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY FOR THE HEALTH PROFESSIONS AND NURSING 538-
539, 1535 (5th ed. 2005).
103 Without being bound by an arbitration agreement, a child may bring a suit
against a physician for injuries related to prenatal care or delivery until the child reaches
the age of maturity because a minor's cause of action is tolled until that date. See Gregory
T. Mueller, Missouri's Malpractice Statute of Limitations, 53 J. Mo. B. 360, 362 (1997)
(citing Strahler v. St. Luke's Hospital, 706 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1986)).
104 Leading cases addressing the issue of a parent binding an unborn child are:
Bolanos v. Khalatian, 283 Cal. Rptr. 209, 212 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that an
arbitration agreement signed by a mother bound all parties whose claims arose out of the
treatments to the patient, including the unborn child); McKinstry v. Valley Obstetrics-
Gynecology Clinic, 405 N.W.2d 88, 91 (Mich. 1987) (affirming that a parent could bind
a minor child to arbitration); Wilson v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 190 Cal. Rptr. 649, 655
(Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that a child was bound to an arbitration agreement for a
claim of prenatal injury when the mother signed the agreement).
105 Crocca, supra note 101, at 88.
106 In United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529 (1993), the Supreme Court announced
the "speak directly" test. The Court held that statutes do not abrogate established
common law principles unless the statute speaks directly to the question addressed by
common law. Id. at 534. This principle is applied at the federal and state level and in
various contexts of law. In Michigan, the now repealed Medical Malpractice Arbitration
Act and section 2912g of the Michigan Compiled Laws modified the common law to
permit a parent to bind a child to an arbitration agreement. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 600.5040 et seq. (West 1987 & Supp. 1993) (repealed 1993); MICH. COMp. LAWS
§ 600.2912g. The McKinstry case illustrates that the state statute allowing a parent to
bind a child to arbitration spoke directly to the common law, thus allowing the statute to
abrogate the common law rule that a parent has no authority to waive, release, or
compromise claims by or against a child. McKinstry, 405 N.W.2d at 99.
107 This issue of whether a parent can bind its child to arbitration is a controversial
issue that has been generating a widespread debate in the arbitration field and state law.
Douglas P. Gerber, Note, The Validity of Binding Arbitration Agreements and Children's
Personal Injury Claims in Florida After Shea v. Global Travel Marketing, Inc., 28 NOVA
L. REV. 167, 169-77 (2003) (discussing case law involving the binding of children's
personal injury, negligence, and tort claims to arbitration).
This note focuses on the laws of California and Michigan. These two states have
addressed the issues of arbitration in relation to a parent and a minor, and a mother and
1024
[Vol. 21:3 2006]
OB/GYN SPECIALTY
expire before arbitration is mandated per agreement. 108 Other state statutes
specifically provide that the parent has the authority to bind a minor child to
arbitration for medical malpractice claims when the parent has signed on
behalf of the child. 10 9 Furthermore, these agreements are not subject to
her unborn child. On a broader scope, other states have upheld a parent's ability to waive
a child's litigation rights in the absence of circumstance supported by public policy.
Global Travel Mktg. v. Shea, 908 So. 2d 392, 396 (Fla. 2005). Hojnowki v. Vans Skate
Park, 868 A.2d 1087, 1093-95 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005). Conversely, states have
refused to enforce contract provisions addressing pre-injury tort or negligence claims
based on public policy. Global Travel Mktg., 908 So. 2d, at 400-02 (discussing case
decisions in Washington, Utah, and Colorado that denied enforcement of agreements
signed by parents on behalf of a minor child addressing liability issues). This Note does
not argue the legality of whether a parent can bind a child to arbitration, but adopts the
holdings of California and Michigan.
Unlike California, Michigan has reformed its arbitration statutes. In 1993, Michigan
reformed its arbitration process and repealed the Medical Malpractice Arbitration Act,
Mich. Comp. Laws 600. 5040 et seq. The reform included provisions requiring notice,
damage caps of up to $75,000, rights of each party, and the ability to appeal. MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §600.2912 (West 2000). However, the power of a parent to enter into
an arbitration agreement on behalf of the child is recognized by the Michigan Supreme
Court. McKinstry, 405 N.W.2d at 99. Although, the Michigan legislature repealed its
specific statutes on medical malpractice arbitration, Michigan law still allows a parent to
bind a minor child to arbitration. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2912g(3)(f) (West
2000); see also John P. Desmond, Comment, Michigan's Medical Malpractice Reform
Revisited-Tighter Damage Caps and Arbitration Provisions, 11 T.M. COOLEY L. REv.
159, 180-81 (1994). Further, Michigan's Court of Appeals continues to interpret and
enforce arbitration agreements under the requirements of the MMAA. See Kosmyna v.
Botsford Comm. Hosp., 607 N.W.2d 134 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000).
108 See MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 600.5041 (West 1987 & Supp. 1993), repealed
by 1993 Mich. Pub. Acts 78, provided in part: "The agreement shall provide that the
person receiving health care treatment or his legal representative may revoke the
agreement within 60 days after execution by notifying the health care provider in writing.
A health care provider may not revoke the agreement after its execution."
109 MICH. CoMip. LAWS ANN. § 600.5046(2) (West 1987 & Supp. 1993), repealed by
1993 Mich. Pub. Acts 78, provided in part: "A minor child shall be bound by a written
agreement to arbitrate disputes, controversies, or issues upon the execution of an
agreement on his behalf by a parent or legal guardian. The minor child may not
subsequently disaffirm the agreement." See also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295(d) (West
1982): "Where the contract is one for medical services to a minor, it shall not be subject
to disaffirmance if signed by the minor's parent or legal guardian." MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 600.2912g(3)(f) (West 2000): "An arbitration agreement under this section signed
on behalf of a minor or a person who is otherwise incompetent is enforceable and is not
subject to disaffirmance or disavowal, if the minor or incompetent person was
represented by an attorney at the time the written agreement was executed." See also
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disaffirmance by the child, even when the child has reached the age of
maturity.I10 The disaffirmance rule has been applied to unborn and not-yet-
conceived children."' 1 Therefore, in everyday practice, a mother can comnit
herself and any future children to a binding arbitration agreement. The
combination of a state's interest in encouraging arbitration and the parents'
willingness to participate in arbitration, provides reasonable justifications for
treating arbitration agreements differently than other contracts executed by
minors. 112 This can create a large impact on an insurance provider's
predictions of litigation risks and insurance costs.
Alternatively, a parent's power to bind the child to arbitration can be
considered implicit in the parent's right and duty to care for the child. It is
within a parent's power to do what is necessary for the child. The ability of
an authoritative figure, a parent, to bind a principle, a child, is analogous to
the duties implied in agency law. An agency relationship contains an implied
authority in which agents have the authority to do whatever is proper and
usual to carry out the agency, such as binding employees that enrolled under
a company's health care plan to arbitration for medical malpractice claims. 11 3
Statutory laws have permitted both types of authoritative parties, parents or
agents, to bind their principles to arbitration agreements-laws that have
been upheld by the courts.'1 4 The courts' strong stance in enforcing statutory
laws that permit binding arbitration for medical malpractice claims within
Crown v. Shafadeh, 403 N.W.2d 465, 466 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); Crocca, supra note
101, at 24.
110 Crocca, supra note 101, at 24.
"I Id.
112 Crocca, supra note 101, at 36; see also Osborne v. Arrington, 394 N.W.2d 67, 70
(Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that "the Legislature has created a specific remedy for the
disability for infants and minors which specifically prohibits minors from subsequently
disaffirming or revoking an arbitration agreement by giving the parent that power");
Crown, 403 N.W.2d at 466. For the purposes of arbitration, the definition of "minor" can
be construed to include an unborn child. See Bolanos v. Khalatian, 283 Cal. Rptr. 209,
212 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Wilson v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 190 Cal. Rptr. 649, 655 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1983); McKinstry, 405 N.W.2d at 91 (affirming that a parent could bind a minor
child to arbitration).
113 See Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 552 P.2d 1178, 1180 (Cal. 1976) (stating
that CAL. CIV. CODE § 2319 grants an agent authority to carry out what is proper and
usual "in carrying out" agency); see also Crocca, supra note 101, at 92.
114 See Doyle v. Giuliucci, 401 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1965) (rejecting that a minor, subject
to a contract between the minor's father and the medical group that provided for
arbitration of medical malpractice claims, could disaffirm an arbitration award); Turner v.
Superior Court, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 84, 87-88 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a provision
for arbitration in a contract was binding on the daughter of an employee's dependent).
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various contexts of authoritative relationships demonstrates the legality of
such a right.
Having arbitration replace the risk of potential litigation for the eighteen
years following a delivery will help alleviate an OB/GYN's fear of lawsuits
and will also play a key role in reducing medical malpractice insurance
premiums. A series of cases have illustrated the courts' propensity to uphold
medical arbitration agreements. 115 There are two approaches for including
the unborn child in the arbitration agreement. The first approach is that if the
mother is a member of an insurance or hospital group, the child becomes part
of that group as soon as it is born, and therefore is bound by the
agreement. 116 The second approach is that the term "patient" is inclusive of
both the mother and the expected child when a pregnant mother is seeking
care. 117 In these situations, the party's knowledge and voluntarily consent to
arbitration for any and all claims arising from the alleged incident is critical.
The act of binding a child to arbitration could be interpreted as waiving
the child's right to a jury trial resulting in a violation of the child's
constitutional rights. However, state courts that have addressed this issue
have held that binding arbitration imposed on the child does not violate the
equal protection clauses 118 of either the federal or state constitutions because
115 Crocca, supra note 101, at 20-24.
116 A well-recognized case on this issue is Wilson v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 190 Cal.
Rptr. 649, 652 (Cal. Ct. App.1983). The court held that a newborn child became a
member of the insurance group at birth and was thus governed by a binding arbitration
agreement in the insurance contract. Id.
117 Bolanos, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 212. In Bolanos, the agreement conformed to the
statutory requirements of California's Code. The arbitration clause made it clear that all
parties whose claims arose out of or related to the treatments of the patient were subject
to the clause. Accordingly, the court applied the statutory prohibition against
disaffirmance to the minor who was unborn at the time. Id.
118 Crown v. Shafadeh, 403 N.W.2d A65, 466 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986). A child's
rights are deemed to be adequately protected by a parent, thus requiring no special
protection by the state. Infancy or age is not determined to be a suspect classification for
equal protection purposes. Id. In addressing the constitutional issue, the U.S. Supreme
Court has stated:
The Equal Protection Clause [U.S. Const. amend. XIV] does, however, deny to
States the power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed
by a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the
objective of that statute. A classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike.
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971) (internal quotations omitted).
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the child's rights are being adequately protected by the parents.19
Furthermore, in a civil action the right to a jury trial is a permissive right, not
an absolute right. 120 The decision to arbitrate does not deprive a person
(child) of a fundamental constitutional right. 121 The right to a jury trial is not
a federal constitutional right, and under state constitutions it is a right that
can be waived or is waived unless demanded. 122
Two states that are leading authorities in binding arbitration agreements
by parents are Michigan 123 and California. 124 California has a strong policy
favoring arbitration, which is not exclusive to adults and encompasses
119 Crocca, supra note 101, at 35-36; see also Crown, 403 N.W.2d at 466
(reaffirming the trial court's holding to compel arbitration in a minor's medical
malpractice suit because age was not a suspect class, and therefore did not violate the
equal protection clause).
120 McKinstry v. Valley Obstetrics-Gynecology Clinic, 405 N.W.2d 88, 95 (Mich.
1987).
121 Id. "The Constitution of the United States does not confer a federal constitutional
right to trial by jury in state court civil cases." Id. (citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189
(1974)).
122 Id. The Michigan Constitution provides in pertinent part: "[t]he right of trial by
jury shall remain, but shall be waived in all civil cases unless demanded by one of the
parties in the manner prescribed by law." MICH. CONST. art. I, § 14. The California
Constitution provides: "[i]n a civil cause a jury may be waived by the consent of the
parties expressed as provided by statute." CAL. CONST. art I, § 16.
123 The leading case under Michigan law is McKinstry v. Valley Obstetrics-
Gynecology Clinic, 405 N.W.2d 88 (Mich. 1987). In McKinstry, the court held that a
"parent of an unborn child, could bind the child, after birth, to arbitration disputes which
arose out of prenatal care and delivery of child." The statute applied by the court is MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 600.5040 et seq. (repealed 1993), which states in pertinent part: "[a]
minor child shall be bound by a written agreement to arbitrate disputes, controversies, or
issues upon the execution of an agreement on his behalf by a parent or legal guardian.
The minor child may not subsequently disaffirm the agreement." Id. at 108.
124 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West 1982) states in pertinent part:
Both parties to this contract, by entering into it, are giving up their constitutional
right to have any such dispute decided in a court of law before a jury, and instead
are accepting the use of arbitration.... (c) Once signed, such a contract governs all
subsequent open-book account transactions for medical services for which the
contract was signed until or unless rescinded by written notice within 30 days of
signature. Written notice of such rescission may be given by a guardian or
conservator of the patient if the patient is incapacitated or a minor. (d) Where the
contract is one for medical services to a minor, it shall not be subject to
disaffirmance if signed by the minor's parent or legal guardian.
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children's rights. 125 Under the relevant California statute, a parent does have
the authority to bind a child, live or unborn, to an arbitration agreement. 26
The possibility of binding an infant or fetus even before conception
occurs is a legitimate option available to the mother. A fetus in utero is
considered a child (minor) for purposes of a binding arbitration agreement. 127
For example, the purpose of Michigan's arbitration statute is to allow parents
to bind their children, all of their children, to arbitration. 128 This purpose
would be undermined if courts held that a distinction could be created based
on when the child was born in regards to when parental consent was given. 129
This is consistent with the fact that neither a minor child nor a fetus in utero
has the capacity to contract for medical care without a parent or guardian
acting on behalf of the child. 130 Furthermore, under Michigan common law, a
fetus in utero is a person for purposes of tort law if the fetus is born alive
subsequent to the alleged injury or if the fetus was otherwise viable at the
time of injury.13' Therefore, a fetus in utero should also be considered a
minor child for purposes of an arbitration statute and a parent's decision to
bind the child to arbitration for any claims.
California state laws provide that there can be a binding effect on a child
even if the child has yet-to-be conceived. 132 By extending the same
principles that are applied to fetuses in utero, a parent is also able to bind a
child that is not even in existence to arbitration. This proposition is based on
that the premise that if non-signatories (minors, fetuses in utero) could be
bound by agreements executed on their behalf, so should yet-to-be conceived
125 See supra notes 15, 117. California's strong policy on arbitration is embodied in
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295(d) (West 1982). This rule was added as part of the Medical
Injury Compensation Reform Act. Id.
126 See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1295(d) (West 1982); see also Bolanos v.
Khalatian, 283 Cal. Rptr. 209, 212 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Wilson v. Kaiser Found. Hosps.,
190 Cal. Rptr. 649, 654 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
127 McKinstry, 405 N.W.2d at 98-99.
128 Id. at 98; Crocca, supra note 101, at 90-91.
129 Crocca, supra note 101, at 90-91.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 91.
132 In Pietrelli v. Peacock, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 688, 689-91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), the
court held that a mother who signed an arbitration agreement that included the phrase
"persons, born or unborn, on behalf of whom I have the power to contract" was binding
on any future children. See also Weldon E. Havins & James Dalessio, Limiting the Scope
of Arbitration Clauses in Medical Malpractice Disputes Arising in California, 28 CAP. U.
L. REV. 331, 344-47 (2000) (discussing the lineage of California cases dealing with
binding an unborn child to an arbitration clause).
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children. 133 A mother who elects to receive obstetric services under the
arbitration agreement impliedly agrees to arbitration for her unborn child.' 34
Furthermore, other areas of law recognize the ability of a person to act on
behalf of, and affect the rights of, a person who has not yet come into
existence.1 35 Once a woman agrees to an arbitration agreement, her unborn
child could also be subject to the agreement, and since a cause of action or
injury could not occur prior to conception, once a child is conceived it is an
unborn child and bound to arbitration. 136
Conversely, a minor child may not be subject to arbitration if the
arbitration agreement contained no reference to an unborn child when the
parent signed. Thus, the services for the child would not be part of the health
care agreement if the agreement did not purport to compel arbitration of any
and all claims arising out of the treatment of the patient. 137 To ensure an
arbitration agreement governs both the mother and the child, an arbitration
agreement must make specific reference to the unborn child or provide that
the agreement covers any and all claims arising out of treatment or care.
Obstetrics is a service that provides medical care for women and unborn
children. 138 Therefore, the circumstance under which a female patient signs
an arbitration agreement differs from an individual signing a contract that
includes an arbitration clause. In the context of an OB/GYN and a potential
child, the courts have held that the parent has indisputable legal authority to
contract for medical services for the unborn child and therefore to bind the
child to arbitration.' 39
IV. OB/GYN ARBITRATION MODEL
In an effort to reduce insurance premiums, the proposed arbitration
model is based on a contractual relationship between the OB/GYN
physicians and their insurance providers, which, through a discount matrix,
133 See Crocca, supra note 101, at 91-92.
13 4 Id. at 88-9 1.
135 Id. at 91 (stating that under estate laws, a child yet-to-be in existence (conceived)
may be entitled to a testamentary bequest at a certain time).
136 Id. at 88-91.
137 Id.
138 See supra text accompanying note 45.
139 See discussion supra Part IlI.B.2.
1030
[Vol. 21:3 2006]
OB/GYN SPECIALTY
will encourage OB/GYNs to enter into consensual arbitration agreements
with their patients.140
A. The Proposed Model for OB/GYNs and Insurance Providers
On a basic level, the model will begin with the patient and the OB/GYN
physician entering into an agreement that binds the physician and the patient,
along with any unborn children, to arbitration. This agreement will establish
that both parties have agreed to mandatory binding arbitration, and that any
resolution resulting from arbitration will be binding on both parties.14' Based
on the percentage of patients within the OB/GYN's practice that have agreed
to arbitration, the insurance provider will reduce the OB/GYN's medical
malpractice insurance premiums. The reduction in premiums would be
correlated to a pre-determined discount matrix based on the percentage of
patients agreeing to arbitration within the OB/GYN's practice.
The model only identifies and proposes a solution between the insurance
provider and the OB/GYN physician. It is merely a starting point in the fight
to keep insurance premiums practicable. The arbitration insurance premium
model is based on a formula that attempts to maintain the integrity of the
insurance actuary algorithms 142 while establishing a discount mechanism to
reduce OB/GYN medical malpractice premiums. The model is based on the
following formula:
Discounted Insurance Premium = Insurance Ratio (Percentage of Patient
Base Agreeing to Arbitration) multiplied by the (Average Claims against an
OB/GYN Physician) multiplied by the (Average Settlement Costs) plus ((1
minus the Percentage of Patient Base Agreeing to Arbitration) multiplied by
the (Average Claims against an OB/GYN Physician) multiplied by the
140 The Arbitration Model could also possibly lend itself to incorporating incentives
for the patients, such as reduced co-payments or a reduction in the monthly insurance
costs, upon agreeing to an arbitration agreement. However, it is beyond the scope of this
Note and must wait for another day.
141 The specific elements of the arbitration agreement would be based on the state's
statutory conditions for valid arbitration agreements. See infra note 183 (identifying that
each state has its own arbitration laws).
142 Insurance companies use actuaries, who are mathematicians, to calculate
insurance risks and premiums using statistical analysis. U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Actuaries, www.bls.gov/oco/ocos04l.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2006);
U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Insurance,
www.bls.gov/oco/cg/cgs028.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2006).
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(Average Judgment Award)) divided by the estimated years the OB/GYN
Physician will work. 143
The first component of the formula is the "insurance ratio." The
insurance ratio is calculated to maintain the existing margins established by
the insurance providers. 144 It is a fixed factor that remains constant
throughout the manipulation of the different variables. Using the national
averages of each of the other variables in the formula, the insurance ratio is
0.32524.145 By manipulating the "Percentage of Patient Base Agreeing to
Arbitration" variable, a sliding scale is established that proposes an alterative
annual insurance premium rate for a practicing OB/GYN. 146
As an OB/GYN's patient base increases the percentage of patients
agreeing to binding arbitration, the insurance company would adjust the
OB/GYN's insurance rate to reflect the accurate discount. 147 For example, an
OB/GYN in private practice that does not have any patients agreeing to
mandatory binding arbitration would pay an annual insurance premium of
$49,530.148 If the same OB/GYN obtains a 20 percent patient base level
143 The formula represents a basic computation of a discount schedule based on the
years remaining in service and the average claims within a career remaining fixed.
However, if this model were put into practice, an equation accounting for the inverse
relationship between the average claims against an OB/GYN in a career and the
remaining years in service would need to be formulated and incorporated into the
formula.
144 Without having access to an insurance provider's actuary tables, I needed to
create a fixed variable that would represent a pre-established profit margin of the
insurance company.
145 The ratio of 0.32524 is based on the following permutations: (($49,530 * 35
years)/2.6 claims per physician career * $2.05 million). The numbers used in the
calculation are the following: $49,530 is the average insurance premium for OB/GYNs,
see supra text accompanying note 17; 35 years is based on a 30 year old, beginning in
private practice and retiring at the age of 65; 2.6 is the average number of claims filed
against OB/GYNs during their careers, see supra note 35 and accompanying text; the
figure of $2.05 million dollars is the median award for childbirth cases, see supra note 49
and accompanying text.
146 See app. A.
147 The adjustment would most likely occur on an annual basis.
148 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. The savings based on the national
average may not present a dramatic illustration, but in states where insurance premiums
have reached a crisis stage, the savings can be significant. In a state, such as Ohio, where
the OB/GYN insurance premiums are over $100,000, a 20% patient base agreeing to
arbitration would reduce an annual medical malpractice insurance premium by almost
$17,000 a year [$83,902=(.65666((.2)(2.6)($400,000)) + ((1-.2)(2.6)($2,050,000)))/35
years]. For Ohio's premium rate see supra note 14.
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agreeing to arbitration, the annual insurance premium would be reduced by
almost eight thousand dollars, which is just over a 16 percent discount. 149
The proposed Discounted Insurance Premium would be available as an
elected provision in the insurance providers' contracts. Therefore, the
OB/GYN or OB/GYN group would be able to elect the provision based on
their own conclusions of whether patients are likely to agree to arbitration.
This incentive of reduced premiums, however, does not come without an
investment from the OB/GYN. The arbitration agreement between the
OB/GYN and the patient would not be an automated process. 150 The
OB/GYN or group would have to invest time and administration in this
initiative.15 1
B. The Patient's Perception
This model provides a strong incentive for OB/GYN physicians to work
with their patients and set up contractual agreements for arbitration. One may
contend that the model is not favorable to patients, argue whether parties
have equal bargaining power, debate whether patients know they are waiving
their right to a jury trial, or question whether third parties have the authority
to bind others (children) to arbitration agreements. These arguments,
however, are not dispositive of the proposed model. 152
The argument that the parties do not have equal bargaining power is
based on the belief that arbitration fees and costs are prohibitive. 153 Yet,
having litigation as a primary method of procuring compensation can
actually preclude one from receiving compensation. Only about two percent
of victims of medical malpractice even file claims.154 One of the major
149 The OB/GYN would pay an estimate of $41,557 [41,557=
(.32524((.2)(2.6)($400,000)) + ((1-.2)(2.6)($2,050,000)))/35 years].
150 See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
151 The contract would have to be presented and explained to the patient prior to the
patient's agreement and signature. The OB/GYN or the office administrator would need
to complete this task. The arbitration clause should state in clear and conspicuous
language that the agreeing party has read and understands the contract. This would
preempt any contractual issue of unconscionability or ambiguity. See CAL. Cry. PROC.
CODE § 1295(b).
152 GAO-03-702, supra note 1, at 53; see also Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses,
Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual Waivers of Constitutional Rights, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBs., Winter/Spring 2004, at 167, 169-7 1.
153 Lisa B. Bingham, Control Over Dispute-System Design and Mandatory
Commercial Arbitration, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs., Winter/Spring 2004, at 221, 235-36.
154 Gibeaut, supra note 43, at 41.
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factors supporting this statistic is that the potential damages are too small to
justify the cost of litigating a case. 155 Furthermore, in medical malpractice
suits, defendants prevail in 75 percent of the cases taken to trial. 156
Therefore, the combination of a low expected level of damages and plaintiffs
succeeding in only 25 percent of the cases that actually reach a trial
inevitably leads many plaintiffs to feel precluded from attempting to recover
from injuries. With the use of arbitration, parties may increase their ability to
retain lawyers and reach settlements because the cost of dispute resolution is
reduced, thus diminishing the need for a pre-determined expectation of
damages.
However, the use of arbitration would not necessarily equate to an
increase in settlement payouts. Arbitration does not function as an incentive
to settle claims because the risk of a jury award is extinguished. The
arbitration process requires investigation and discovery to determine a
physician's negligence or fault. Contrary to public perception, jury
verdicts-not awards-are most likely consistent with neutral medical
experts. 157 Based on the assumption that arbitration panels would produce
like findings to a jury, plaintiffs would receive favorable results only 9
percent of the time. 158 Further, as discussed supra, 49.5 percent of the claims
against OB/GYNs are dropped, dismissed, or settled w ithout payment, and of
the cases that do proceed to court OB/GYNS win 81.3 percent of the time.159
This ratio would most likely remain intact since the only change is the
elected forum and not the physician's standard of care.
Conversely, one may conclude that insurance companies would pay the
same monetary amounts as jury awards if there was an increase in claims
because of arbitration-assuming that 25 percent of these new claims would
result in settlement payouts. However, this contention does not consider the
economic advantages of arbitration from an execution aspect. The potential
increase in settlement payouts may be offset by the reduced fees for
155 Id. Plaintiff attorneys take suits on a contingency basis so the expected prayer for
damages must exceed the projected cost of litigation. Contingency fees average around
forty percent of the jury award. See generally Stephen D. Annand & Roberta F. Green,
Legislative and Judicial Controls of Contingency Fees in Tort Cases, 99 W. VA. L. REV.
81, 93 n.28 (1996) (discussing how contingency fees can mask the excessive fees being
charged for tort litigation).
156 Gibeaut, supra note 43, at 41.
157 Neil Vidmar, Medical Malpractice Lawsuits: An Essay on Patient Interests, The
Contingency Fee System, Juries, and Social Policy, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1217, 1237
(2005).
158 See supra note 42.
159 See supra text accompanying note 36.
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arbitrating a claim versus litigating a claim, and also by the reduction of
"nuisance settlements. 160 The cost of arbitration versus litigation provides a
cost savings for defendants in both time and money. 161 Also, a decrease in
nuisance settlements helps keep the economic scale tipped in arbitration's
favor. A nuisance settlement is a payout that a defendant offers because it is
less expensive then proceeding with a defense. 162 The previous practice of
offering nuisance settlements claims is enough incentive for plaintiffs to
pursue such claims. 163 However, the decreased costs and speedy resolution of
arbitration deters a defendant from offering a generous nuisance settlement-
thus increasing an insurer's cost-savings. 164 In light of these two examples,
even if settlement payouts would increase due to an onslaught of arbitrated
claims, insurance providers' cost savings could be sustained.
The debate on contractually waiving a person's right to a jury trial has
been at the center of the controversy in arbitration law. 165 The proposed
model is based on a patient signing a contract with the OB/GYN to arbitrate
any dispute over a patient's current services or the future care of the patient
and unborn children. Therefore, the arbitration clause would be governed
under contract law, which provides that the standards for arbitration law
consent are the same as for contract law consent. 166 Contractual consent is
160 A "nuisance settlement" represents the nuisance value of the suit "-the expense,
harassment, and embarrassment that the defendant may endure in defending the suit." Ari
Dobner, Litigation for Sale, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1529, 1576 (1996).
161 See AAA, ABA, AMA, COMMISSION ON HEALTH CARE DIsPUTE RESOLUTION 30
(July 27, 1998). The use of arbitration for medical malpractice disputes reduces economic
costs to both parties and is usually more expedient. Rallo, supra note 15, at 524.
Arbitrated cases are typically cheaper than litigated cases because most of the arbitrated
cases are resolved in less than a year. Gail Garfinkel Weiss, Malpractice Mess: Is This
the Way Out?, MED. ECON., July 9, 2004,
http://www.memag.com/memag/article/articleDetail.jsp?id= 108984.
162 Dobner, supra note 160, at 1576.
163 A patient with a weak claim--dare to say a frivolous claim-may still bring such
a claim merely to try and get the defending physician to pay a nuisance settlement. Id.;
see also David J. Sokol, The Current Status of Medical Malpractice Countersuits, 10 AM.
J.L. & MED. 439, 449 (1985) (stating that many medical malpractice claims are instituted
to obtain a nuisance settlement). Nuisance settlements can also invoke a defending
physician to file a countersuit in response to a frivolous suit or an abuse of process. Id. at
449. Physicians have received favorable outcomes at the trial and appellate levels, and
have obtained out-of-court settlements. Id.
164 See Michael Krauss, Which Tort Reform Options? Some Solutions Work Much
Better with the Nature of Tort Law, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 28, 2005, at 37-38.
165 Ware, supra note 152, at 171.
166 Id.
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based on mutual assent-both parties' actions illustrate their intentions to
enter into a contract. Nonetheless, exceptions such as unconscionability
apply to both contract law and arbitration law.167 Unconscionability is
present in both contexts when there is a lack of understanding or a gross
inequality in bargaining power. 168
Critics of the FAA's contractual consent standard desire a higher
standard requiring "knowing" consent. 169 A "knowing" standard resembles a
contractual consent standard but further extends the unconscionability
doctrine exception. 170 For an arbitration clause, also known as a jury waiver
clause, to satisfy a knowing requirement, it cannot merely be present in the
agreement but each party must be aware of the clause and understand it. 171
The proposed OB/GYN arbitration model meets both levels of consent.
The agreement to arbitrate between the patient and the OB/GYN is based on
a contractual agreement, entered into voluntarily, which satisfies the current
standard for contractual mutual assent, thus satisfying arbitration law
consent. Furthermore, this arbitration agreement would satisfy a requirement
The FFA's contractual approach finds consent to arbitrate if the contract-law
doctrine of mutual assent is satisfied. Importantly, contract law generally treats
consent as an objective, rather than a subjective, phenomenon. In particular,
formation of a contract requires, not mutual assent, but mutual manifestations of
assent. The requirement to form a contract is not that parties actually assent to its
terms.... [but] that they take actions-such as signing their names on a document
or saying certain words-that would lead a reasonable person to believe that they
have assented to the terms of the contract.
Id (internal quotations omitted).
167 Id. at 172 (referring to the exceptions in contract law that would invalidate a
contract despite a signature or "blanket" assent).
168 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981).
169 Ware, supra note 152, at 174.
170 Id.
171 Courts typically consider any actual negotiations over the clause, whether the
clause was presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, the conspicuousness of the
waiver, the degree of bargaining disparity between the parties, and the experience
and sophistication of the party opposing the waiver. Courts have not been explicit as
to how these factors relate to one another, but seem to consider them all together.
Thus, it is not necessary to make a strong showing on all of the factors to uphold a
jury waiver clause. Equally, it is not necessary to make a strong showing on all of
the factors to defeat a jury waiver clause.
Id. (quoting Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the
Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 669, 680-81
(2001)).
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of knowing consent because the agreement is elected by the patient as an
option presented by the OB/GYN, unlike an adhesion agreement that is a
prerequisite to receiving services or goods.
The third and last concern from the patient's perspective is the authority
to bind an unborn patient to arbitration. 172 The ability of a mother to bind an
unborn child, even a child not yet conceived, may appear to limit that
individual's right to elect litigation and a trial by jury. The courts have
decided this controversial issue. 173 The standard hypothetical, reflective of a
common circumstance, involves an individual patient contracting with an
individual physician. 174 However, due to the unique nature of an OB/GYN's
medical service, delivering a child, the standard hypothetical is not
applicable because an OB/GYN is liable for an injury that is later discovered
and allegedly related to the delivery of the child until the child reaches a
designated age set by the state. 175 The typical period of liability for an
OB/GYN is eighteen years for every child delivered. 176 Therefore, for
arbitration to meet its objective as an influential method of reducing
insurance premiums, all parties involved, not just the mother, need to be
bound by the arbitration clause.
C. Binding Judgments
One of the strengths of the proposed Discounted Insurance Premium
Model is the strong tendency of the courts to uphold arbitration clauses and
decisions. 177 The designed purpose of arbitration is to render a final and
binding decision with the same legal effect as a judicial determination. 178
Unlike the appellate review process for the judicial system, the law does not
permit judicial review of the substantive aspects of the arbitral proceedings
172 See discussion supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the authority of mothers to bind
unborn children to arbitration).
173 See cases cited supra note 104.
174 This particular circumstance is mirrored in Bolanos v. Khalatian, 283 Cal. Rptr.
209, 212 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), in which the court upheld the arbitration agreement as
binding on all parties, including born and unborn children. See also Havins & Dalessio,
supra note 132, at 346-47.
175 See supra note 103.
176 Id.
177 See cases cited supra note 104 (reviewing cases in the OBIGYN context, the
listed cases adequately illustrate the courts' rationale in upholding arbitration clauses).
178 Eric James Fuglsang, Comment, The Arbitrability of Domestic Antitrust
Disputes: Where Does the Law Stand?, 46 DEPAUL L. REv. 779, 784 (1997) (describing
the nature and purpose of arbitration and its interaction with the judicial system).
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and generally does not permit vacating arbitral awards. 179 There are a few
exceptions under which the court can order a vacation or modification of the
award.' 80 Thus, a patient is not completely barred from the judicial system
when contractually agreeing to arbitrate but must fit into one of the limited
exceptions.
In addition to challenging an arbitral award, the patient can also
challenge the validity of the arbitration clause. 181 Under the proposed model,
however, a patient may not find this to be a successful avenue for gaining
judicial review of an arbitration clause. Arbitration agreements or clauses are
generally held to be enforceable against the party that signed the
agreement' 82 as long as the agreement meets the statutory conditions of the
179 Id.
18 0 The narrow exceptions for vacating an arbitral award are provided in 9 U.S.C.
§ 10, which states that United States courts:
[W]herein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the
application of any party to the arbitration- (1) [w]here the award was procured by
corruption, fraud, or undue means. (2) [w]here there was evident partiality or
corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them. (3) [w]here the arbitrators were guilty
of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or
in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any
other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced. (4) [or]
[w]here arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000). An award can be modified or corrected under 9 U.S.C. § 11, which
states:
[An order modifying or correcting the award [may be made] upon the application of
any party to the arbitration--(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation
of figures or an evident material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or
property referred to in the award. (b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a
matter not submitted to them, unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the
decision upon the matter submitted. (c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of
form not affecting the merits of the controversy. The order may modify and correct
the award, so as to effect the intent thereof and promote justice between the parties.
9 U.S.C. § 11 (2000).
181 Andre V. Egle, Back to Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing
Co.: To Challenge an Arbitration Agreement You Must Challenge the Arbitration
Agreement, 78 WASH. L. REV. 199, 200-202 (2003) (discussing the conflicting circuit
court holdings on the issue of whether an arbitration agreement itself must be challenged
or if it is sufficient that the contractual agreement is found to be void).
182 Ann H. Nevers, Medical Malpractice Arbitration in the New Millennium: Much
Ado About Nothing, 1 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 45, 56-57 (2000) (discussing the lack of
arbitration in medical malpractice claims even after courts have upheld arbitration
clauses).
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jurisdiction. 183 However, patients have had success when the clauses were
found to be fraudulently induced or unconscionable. 184
Accordingly, when parties consent to resolve any future disputes by
arbitration, they waive their right to litigate the dispute in court.185 The
review process of an arbitration settlement is largely insulated by the
FAA. 186 Once a decision is reached, the FAA imposes strict limits on a
court's ability to overturn an arbitral award. 187 To that end, when parties
agree to arbitrate, the law makes the clause enforceable and irrevocable.188
Therefore, the insurance provider can incorporate as a factor, the calculated
risk that the arbitration clause will be enforced, alleviating the potential risks
of additional costs for litigation after the initial cost of arbitration.
V. CONCLUSION
As a result of increasing medical malpractice insurance premiums,
women's health care is in a state of crisis with OB/GYN physicians
eliminating services or leaving the specialty practice altogether. Yet, we,
society and the legal community, fail to leverage the dispute resolution tools
that are available today to implement an alternative approach to combat this
issue. The specialty of OB/GYN poses unique challenges to establishing a
dispute resolution model that will promote efficient and binding adjudication
while having the predictability to create a cost benefit model to help lower
insurance premiums. Arbitration seems to fit the bill.
183 Each state that has adopted an arbitration statute has identified requisite factors
that must be met for an arbitration clause to be determined valid. Id. at 66 n.157. For
example, in Michigan, to comply with statutory conditions, the arbitration clause must be
in writing, accepted by the patient, not revoked within 60 days, state that it is not a
prerequisite to health care or treatment, and in addition, the patient must be given a
booklet containing specific provisions of the arbitration agreement. McKinstry v. Valley
Obstetrics-Gynecology Clinic, 405 N.W.2d 88, 92 (Mich. 1987).
184 Nevers, supra note 182, at 60.
185 Andrew T. Guzman, Arbitrator Liability: Reconciling Arbitration and
Mandatory Rules, 49 DUKE L.J. 1279, 1301 (2000) (discussing the process an individual
follows, under existing law, when she consents to have future disputes settled through
arbitration).
186 Elizabeth G. Thomburg, Contracting with Tortfeasors: Mandatory Arbitration
Clauses and Personal Injury Claims, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at
253, 266 (discussing the interjection of mandatory arbitration clauses into contractual
agreements).
187 Id.; see also Guzman, supra note 185, at 1301.
188 Guzman, supra note 185, at 1301.
1039
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
An OB/GYN shares the joy of bringing new life into the world, but is
also required to carry the risk of liability for eighteen years. Arbitration can
provide a method to minimize the risk thus, resulting in lower insurance
premiums. An OB/GYN and a patient can enter into a contractual
relationship that will ensure that the parties will arbitrate all future disputes-
decreasing the exposure of extraordinary jury awards. The well established
jurisprudence that arbitration clauses and arbitral awards will unlikely be
overturned provides strength and stability to the model. Therefore, by
implementing a binding arbitration model, we are taking the first step
towards ensuring that women will receive the best care available.
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Appendix A
Insurance Premium Discount Matrix*
0% $49,530
10% $45,543
20% $41,557
30% $37,570
40% $33,584
50% $29,597
60% $25,611
70% $21,624
80% $17,638
90% $13,651
This discount matrix is based on the national average.
Estimated Average Percentage ofAnnual Years of Claims Average Average Patient Base
Premium Service Against Jury Award Settlement Agreeing to
Physician Arbitration
$49,530 35 2.6 $2,050,000 $400,000 0
$49,530 35 2.6 $2,050,000 $400,000 10%
$49,530 35 2.6 $2,050,000 $400,000 20%
$49,530 35 2.6 $2,050,000 $400,000 30%
$49,530 35 2.6 $2,050,000 $400,000 40%
$49,530 35 2.6 $2,050,000 $400,000 50%
$49,530 35 2.6 $2,050,000 $400,000 60%
$49,530 35 2.6 $2,050,000 $400,000 70%
$49,530 35 2.6 $2,050,000 $400,000 80%
$49,530 35 2.6 $2,050,000 $400,000 90%
Insurance Ratio** = 0.32524
*Insurance Ratio is the fixed variable calculated to maintain the insurance provider's margin.
1041
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
State Example of a discount matrix for a state that averages an annual payment of
$100,000 for medical malpractice insurance.
State X Insurance Premium Discount Matrix
0% $100,000
10% $91,951
20% $83,902
30% $75,854
40% $67,805
50% $59,756
60% $51,707
70% $43,659
80% $35,610
90% $27,561
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